I thought I would share something I pulled together for my own piece of mind in trying to understand just where we are in the RV process. A couple of things I looked at were some background information into how things came about in terms of the power-sharing agreements, the Erbil Agreement, and the dynamics of what seems to be holding things up.
First, it appears there is a signed agreement or agreements (several articles say six or more), although we don't have copies published anywhere that I can find:
Excerpt:
"The Kurdistan Region's President Massoud Barzani presented last October a political initiative to help the winning blocs reach agreements about the sharing of the three presidencies in the Iraqi state and the formation of a national partnership government.
The move came as a bid to break the political deadlock that disabled the country’s political process from the time of the general elections in March last year to the formation of the new Iraqi government nine months later.
Barzani’s initiative led to a series of meetings between the political blocs and culminated in a gathering of Iraq’s political leaders in Erbil when a final agreement was signed by all."
End Excerpt. See: http://www.aknews.co...knews/4/215279/
Here's an excerpt from wiki regarding the 19 Kurdish demands that, because Maliki agreed to more, the Kurds back him over Allawi for Prime Minister:
"In August the KBC announced 19 demands which would have to be agreed upon by al-Maliki or Allawi for them to join their government.[119] The Islamic Supreme Council of Iraq then agreed to all 19 demands.[120] Incumbent Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki agreed to 18 out of 19 demands (including implementation of article 140),only disagreeing with the demand that the government were to resign if the Kurdistan Alliance withdraws.[121] Al-Iraqiya, however, rejected 9 of the Kurdish demands, including the demands for a Kurdish presidency, Iraqi government funding of the Peshmerga and for the implementation of article 140 of the Iraqi constitution."
See: http://en.wikipedia...._election,_2010
(btw, you will find this history in the wiki reference a fascinating read. --- It's a wonder they get anything done...lol)
The 19 demands forming the basis of the Erbil Agreement were outlined here:
http://www.ekurd.net...8/state4137.htm
Once it was decided who would be Prime Minister (based on who agreed to the most of the Kurdish demands), Barzani then brokered the power sharing deal. It too was signed. Here's an excerpt from one news article on it:
Iraq's deeply divided political factions have sealed a power-sharing deal more than eight months after an inconclusive general election, paving the way for MPs to elect a speaker on Thursday.
The deal, clinched late Wednesday night after three days of high-pressure talks between the rival factions, sees Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki, a Shiite, set to return for a second term, Jalal Talabani, a Kurd, likely to retain the presidency and a Sunni Arab MP poised to be elected as speaker of parliament.
It also establishes a new statutory body to oversee security as a sop to former Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, who had held out for months to take the premiership from al-Maliki after his mainly Sunni-backed Iraqiya bloc narrowly won more seats in the March election.
The hard-won agreement now paves the way for an end to a months-long power vacuum that had witnessed growing violence in the country. Allawi's Iraqiya blocconfirmed it finally signed the deal. "I can confirm there was an accord last night, but I cannot give details," Iraqiya spokesman Intissar Allawi said.
http://www.hurriyetd...vote-2010-11-11
Another news article excerpt on it that sheds light on what Allawi's particular demands are:
The power-sharing deal, clinched after three days of heated talks, stipulated that a Sunni be speaker, and that al-Maliki and Talabani retain their posts.
The agreement established a statutory body to oversee security as a gesture to Allawi, who had held out for months to take the job from al-Maliki.
Iraqiya's conditions
Iraqiya has said its participation hinged on four conditions: a bill forming the security body; a committee examining cases against political detainees; codification of the power-sharing deal; and annulment of the bans against the three Iraqiya members.
http://english.aljaz...3623573512.html
See also: http://english.aljaz...9329394717.html
Here's another one describing the process of how it came about:
After months of deadlock when it seemed that it could swing either way, the balance slowly began to tilt towards Mr Maliki in early October.
That is when the militant young Shia cleric, Moqtada Sadr, whose website only two months earlier had been openly attacking Mr Maliki, announced his support for the incumbent - adding another 40 seats to his coalition portfolio.
Mr Sadr has been resident in the Iranian holy city of Qom for several years, and it was widely assumed in Baghdad that he had succumbed to Iranian pressures.
In the intervening weeks, there were further straws in the wind. The Fadhila party announced that it was backing Mr Maliki. Then the Centre Bloc did the same.
Numerically, it still did not add up to the necessary 163-seat majority - for that, either side would need the support of the Kurdistan alliance, with its 57 seats.
But the Kurds, while refraining from openly endorsing Mr Maliki, showed signs of leaning in his direction, not least because he went further than Mr Allawi in accepting the 19-point list of demands laid out by Kurdish leaders.
. . . .
By the time the parliamentary session was imminent, Mr Allawi had been comprehensively outmanoeuvred.
Protracted drama
His hopes for a real share in power are now pinned on the "National Council for Strategic Policies" which has been offered to him or his assign.
Al-Iraqiyya had tried to establish it as a body with powers equal to those of the prime minister, especially in security issues - a concept resisted by Mr Maliki's camp which argued that it would make for weak government.
In the talks leading up to the parliamentary meeting, it was apparently agreed that unanimous decisions by the council would be binding, though given the balanced composition the body will doubtless have, unanimity may be rare.
Its powers may well be one of the main political battlegrounds in the coming period.
See: http://www.bbc.co.uk...e-east-11748816
Well, is that last excerpt sentence an understatement or what? LOL
BTW, the BBC article is excellent to read in full.
Well, Allawi may be a moot point though, if this news article below is correct. Apparently there are accusations that he or some of his cohorts are behind the terrorism and violence going on. Within the same article it says this regarding how much of the Erbil Agreement is left to implement:
With regard to what has implemented initiative of the President of Kurdistan Regional Government, Massoud Barzani said that the logistical 90% of the paragraphs of this initiative has been implemented and what remains is the National Council for the strategic policy, which has been debated and discussed, but the Iraqi withdrawal from negotiations which is the failure to fully implement the initiative.
http://translate.goo...www.ipairaq.com
This sounded familiar....i.e., that 90% had already been implemented.
See: http:// currencynewshound.wordpress.com/2011/05/20/deputy-in-the-state-of-law-emphasizes-achieving-90-of-the-agreements-of-arbil-and-describes-the-dialogue-with-iraqs-positive/
Here's another: http://www.alsumaria...-achieved..html
Well, at any rate-- It looks like there are agreements (Erbil Agreement and power sharing agreements) put in writing and signed, but obviously they are not made public. We know the gist of the Kurdish 19 demands, but that Maliki only agreed to 18 of the 19. So obviously what we see as the 19 published in the news is not THE agreement, but it does provide an idea of what the general basis is. The only thing Maliki did not agree to was that should the Kurds withdraw for any reason, that the Iraqi government would dissolve. If the news is to be believed, then "90%" of it is implemented, with only the legislation to create the NCSP, its powers (which I believe is the real issue), and who will head it (because it is not a given that it will be Allawi-- only that it will be from his bloc).
Why is this even important?
Because contrary to popular opinion, the GOI isn't formed yet. And contrary to popular opinion, the finished GOI is required for them to get out of Ch. VII. And until they get out of Ch. VII, they are not going to move to a tradeable currency (from IMF Art. XIV to IMF Art. VII). I posted the following elsewhere, but for the sake of completeness I'll repost it here.
Look at paragraph 20 through 22 here: http://www.uncc.ch/r...tio/res1483.pdf
The wording of all three indicate very clearly that Maliki cannot remain as the proxy in those positions. Note the following wording, and that it all pertains to the release of DFI funds and the Compensation funds, which is all that remains under UNSC Res. 1483:
"...an internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq is properly constituted;" (paragraph 20)
"...properly constituted, internationally recognized, representative government of Iraq" (paragraph 21)
Paragraph 22, mentions much the same.
The formation of the government must meet the UN's blessing. Note the wording above, internationally recognized.
The UN has been even more specific though:
"Kirkuk (Sumerian News) invited the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Iraqi politicians Ed melkert to expedite the conclusion of outstanding issues in order to promote stability in the country, and expressed concern about the continuing violence, the international organization's readiness to provide support to all parties to achieve security."
....
"....since last March, an escalation in the violence killing dozens including several officers and officials, amid continuing political crisis caused by incomplete formation of the Government, and the lack of agreement on names who will manage the security ministries..."
http://www.microsoft...ew.asp?ID=39400
The bottom line is that until they name the security ministries that represent a properly constituted government according to the power sharing agreements they signed last year (as well as the creation of the National Council for Strategic Policies), they will not have stability and security in the region--- and the UN does not have to release them from CH. VII.
The back and forth about whether they are truly a complete GOI or not is a result of technicalities. Technically, according to their Constitution, Maliki did not really finish forming the government within the constitutionally mandated timeframe. Technically. However, you saw all the spin in the news and the backslapping that was done as they just put that little thing aside and 'called' it complete so that they (and the US and UN) could have their 15 minutes of fame about the success of Iraq coming out of the sanctions of CH VII on Dec. 15. The news SAID they were a complete GOI-- but in fact, they were not really complete because of these ministries that yet STILL remain to be filled.
For the sake of expediency, they overlooked this technicality because they had power sharing agreements in place, and because all parties knew (know) that the deadline looms and they will all have egg on their face if they fail to complete this and instead have all the news reporting their failure. Besides, the UN and US still "holds the purse"-- the DFI accounts. They are tied up until they come out of CH. VII, and it was assumed that they realize that they can continue to tie up these funds if they fail. Only when they come out of Ch. VII do the funds get released and not under restricted use mandated by the UN.
As it pertains to the "internationally tradeable currency" issue, this is a separate issue that is under the IMF. It is conceivable that they would time a move from Article XIV (transitional arrangement they are currently under) to Article VIII (internationally tradeable currency), but nothing mandates it. But it goes without saying that there is no way in the world they would risk coming out of the transitional arrangement with the stability and security issue unresolved. NO WAY. This is why Shabibi has ALWAYS STRESSED STABILITY AND SECURITY. He is saying when they get these critical issues solved, then we'll deal with revaluing the dinar (move to Art. VIII). You have to think about this logically-- A country's CURRENCY is fiat based--- It is based on the FAITH that people have in its GOVERNMENT. Even the US dollar is backed by the "full faith and credit OF THE US GOVERNMENT." It is like that with any fiat currency. It is only as good as the faith that people have in its government-- Therefore, until the stability and security issues are resolved (and this means completing the GOI by filling those security ministries), then we cannot expect anyone to have faith in its currency.
